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Agent Pay Reward Evidence Importance
A1 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.5
A2 0.8 0.6 0.571 0.7






















































































































































































































































































Component eigenvalue percentage	of	variance cumulative	percentageof	variance
comp	1 5.121246864 64.01558580 64.01559
comp	2 1.030778625 12.88473282 76.90032
comp	3 0.772543595 9.65679494 86.55711
comp	4 0.468223808 5.85279760 92.40991
comp	5 0.420790991 5.25988738 97.66980
comp	6 0.126523345 1.58154181 99.25134
comp	7 0.054744103 0.68430128 99.93564
comp	8 0.005148669 0.06435836 100.00000
Figure	29:	Low	Normative	Redistribution.	Only	the	first	two	components	are
significant	because	they	have	eigenvalues	>	1.
Component eigenvalue percentage	of	variance cumulative	percentageof	variance
comp	1 3.3137638846 41.42204856 41.42205
comp	2 1.2416895774 15.52111972 56.94317
comp	3 1.1055887273 13.81985909 70.76303
comp	4 1.0063573718 12.57946715 83.34249
comp	5 0.8456376275 10.57047034 93.91296
comp	6 0.3882566455 4.85320807 98.76617
comp	7 0.0981938786 1.22742348 99.99360
































Parameter comp1 comp	2 comp	3 comp	4
Normative	Redistribution -0.043130 0.816307 0.135318 0.073938
Argumentative	Redistribution 0.023861 -0.016411 0.016871 0.115345
Spatial	Distribution -0.304245 -0.132709 0.045772 -0.256649
Reputation	Distribution 0.885499 -0.441814 0.054505 0.146949
Average	Belief -0.970050 -0.139624 -0.170281 0.044717
Belief	Distribution 0.966860 0.139989 0.180188 -0.039016
Average	Importance 0.689594 0.155347 -0.464526 -0.202780





























































































e1	 	AE(e1,	e2)	 	e2	if	e1	 	0.5	 	e2	;
6.	 AI	is	controversial:	similar	evidence	leads	to	weakening	of	importance,	contradicting	evidence	leads	to	strengthening	of	importance,	so	
AI((e1,	i1),(e2,	i2))	 	0.5(i1	+	i2)	if	e1,	e2	 	0.5	or	e1,	e2	 	0.5	,	
AI((e1,	i1),(e2,	i2))	 	0.5(i1	+	i2)	if	e1	 	0.5	 	e2	.
These	requirements	are	met	by	the	following	definitions:
AE(e1,	e2) = 2e1e2 if	e1,	e2	 	0.5
	 = 2e1	+2e2	-2e1e2	-	1 if	e1,	e2	 	0.5











(r0,	s0) = (e0,	i0) 	
(rn+1,	sn+1) = A((rn,	sn),(en+1,	in+1)) for	alln	 	N
When	does	((rn,	sn)	|	n	 	N)	converge	to	a	limit?	To	formulate	some	properties,	we	use	the	following	notion:
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sequence	(xn	|	n	 	N)	is	well	below	a	if	there	is	a	b	<	a	and	a	m	 	N	such	that	xn	 	b	for	all	n	 	m	;
and	'well	above	a	'	is	defined	similarly.	Now	we	have:
1.	 if	(en	|	n	 	N)	is	well	below	0.5,	then	the	result	sequence	of	((en,	in)	|	n	 	N)	converges	to	the	limit	(0,0);

















































   props           ; a list of pairs: < evidence importance >
                   ; the evidence of the p-th proposition is: first item p props
                   ; the importance of the p-th proposition is: second item p props
   init-props      ; a list of pairs: < evidence importance > the initial values
   announcements   ; a list of 4-tuples: < key <evidence importance> ticks reputation>              
   attacks         ; a list of pairs: < attacking-agent prop >
   questions       ; a list of pairs: < requesting-agent prop >
   profit-strategy ; list of learned profits for each strategy
   prior-size      ; prior size for profit





   delta                ; a small value
   action-prob-pairs    ; a list of odds-action pairs, 
                        ; one for each behavioral alternative
   current-prop         ; the proposition which is pictured in the world
   number-of-props
   total-odds           ; the sum of the odds of all behavioral alternatives
   change-reputation    ; the change of the sum of the reputation of all agents 
                        ; during one cycle
   total-reputation     ; the sum of the reputation of all agents
   filename
   agentsorderedatstart ; for reporting purposes




  report item 1 l
end
to-report zip [l m]
  ifelse empty? l [report l]
    [report fput (list (first l) (first m)) (zip (butfirst l) (butfirst m))]
end
to-report sign [x]
  ifelse x >= 0 [report 1] [report -1]
end
; The Acceptance of Announcements
to-report agreementfactor [e1 e2]
  report (2 * e1 - 1) * (2 * e2 - 1)
end
to-report accepte [e1 e2]
  ifelse e1 < 0.5 [
    ifelse e2 < 0.5 [
      report   2 * e1 * e2 
    ][
      report   e1 + e2 - 0.5 
      ]
  ][ifelse e2 < 0.5 [
       report   e1 + e2 - 0.5  
     ][
       report   2 * e1 + 2 * e2 - 2 * e1 * e2 - 1
     ]
  ] 
end
to-report accepti [agree i1 i2]
  report (i1 + i2 + agree * (2 * i1 * i2 - i1 - i2)) / 2
end
; environment oriented procedures for accepting announcements and
; forgetting. the patches are used for anonymous communication. 
; the information of announcements are accumulated in the patches
; according to the accept function. forgetting is a
; a gradual move towards neutral values ((e,i) = (0.5, 0.5))
to announce-patch [agnt loc evid imp]; patch procedure; input agent is a turtle
; update the patches with the information of the announcement
; this is proportional to the distance from the agent that made the announcement.
  let rsquared (distance agnt + 1) ^ 2 
  let pevid first item loc pprops
  let pimp second item loc pprops
  let agree (agreementfactor evid pevid)
  set pevid 0.5 + ((accepte evid pevid) - 0.5 + rsquared * (pevid - 0.5)) /
                    (rsquared + 1)
  set pimp ((accepti agree imp pimp)  + rsquared * pimp) / (rsquared + 1)
  set pprops replace-item loc pprops (list pevid pimp)
end
; Forgetting means changing gradually the pevidence and pimportance
; to a neutral value (which is 0.5)
to-report forget-pevidence [pevidence]
  report  pevidence - sign (pevidence - 0.5) * forgetspeed 
   
end
to-report forget-pimportance [pimportance]
 report  pimportance - sign (pimportance - neutral-importance) * forgetspeed 
end
; Agent-agent communication, used in announcements, questions and
; replies on attacks.
to update-announcement [w p ev i ] ; w = sender, p = proposition
  ; update memory
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  let key number-of-agents * p + w
  let loc find-location key announcements
  ifelse loc != false [
      set announcements 
         replace-item loc announcements (list key (list ev i) ticks)
            ; do something with reputation
    ][
      set announcements fput (list key (list ev i) ticks) announcements]
  ; now the SJT type attraction and rejection
  let evidence first item p props  
  let importance second item p props
  let agree (agreementfactor evidence  ev)  
  if agree > 1 - attraction [
      setopinion p  (list (accepte evidence ev) (accepti agree importance i))
    ] ; accept p
  if agree < rejection - 1 [
     setopinion p (list (accepte evidence (1 - ev)) 
                     (accepti (agreementfactor evidence (1 - ev)) importance i))
    ]  ; attack agent w on p
end
to-report find-location [a b]
  report position a (map [first ?] b)
end
to forget-announcements
; all announcements older than 10 ticks are forgotten
   let yesterday ticks - 10
   set announcements filter [ yesterday < item 2  ?]  announcements
end
; initialization and the main loop
;;to-report random-prop ; to create a proposition with random evidence 
                      ; and importance values, used in setup





  set delta 1e-5
  set number-of-props number-of-propositions
  set current-prop min (list (position current-proposition 
             ["a" "b" "c" "d" "e" "f" "g" "h" "i" "j"]) (number-of-props - 1))
  ;; create turtles with random  locations, evidence and importance values
  set strategy-shapes ["circle" "default" "face happy"]
  set-default-shape turtles "circle"
  ask patches [
    set pcolor blue 
    set pprops[]
    repeat number-of-props [
      set pprops fput (list 0.5 neutral-importance) pprops]
  ]
  crt number-of-agents [
    setxy random-xcor random-ycor 
    set props generateopinions 
    set init-props props
    set announcements []
    set attacks []
    set questions []
    set color  scale-color yellow  first (item current-prop props)  1 0
    set label who
    set label-color 66
    set size (random-float 2) + 1
    set profit-strategy [0 0 0]
  ]
  set total-reputation  sum [size] of turtles   
  setup-plot
  ;update-plotfile ;; !!!!!!!
end
to-report incr-total-odds [ee]
  set total-odds total-odds + ee
  report total-odds
end
to-report find-action [c l]
  while [c > first (first l) ] [set l but-first l] 
  report first l
end
to go
; Determine the chances of all agent actions according to the values
; of the global parameters, chance-announce, chance-question, chance-attack,
; chance-walk, chance-learn-by-neighbour, chance-learn-by-environment,
; chance-mutation and chance-change-strategy
   set total-odds 0
   set action-prob-pairs (map [list (incr-total-odds ?1) ?2]
         (list chance-announce chance-question chance-attack chance-walk 
               chance-learn-by-neighbour chance-learn-by-environment
               chance-mutation chance-change-strategy)
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         (list "announce" "question" "attack" "walk" "learn-by-neighbour" 
              "learn-by-environment" "mutate" "change-strategy" ))                        
   set change-reputation 0
   ask turtles [act]
   ; The forgetting of anonymous information
   ask patches [  ; to forget
       set pprops map [ 
              list (forget-pevidence first ?) (forget-pimportance second ?)]
                  pprops ]   
   ; Rounding off: forget announcements, answer some questions which were put
   ; in this cycle and reply some attacks made by other agents in this cycle.
   ; These three actions are different from the previous ones by the fact that
   ; they are performed each cycle, so they are not subject to some choice 
   ; constrained by global parameters.
   ask turtles [  
       forget-announcements
       answer-questions
       reply-attacks
       ]
   ; The change of reputation is normalized so that the sum of the reputations
   ; of all agents (total-reputation) remains constant over time.   
   let f total-reputation / (total-reputation + change-reputation)
   ask turtles [set size max (list 0 (size * f))]
   show-world
   tick
end
to-report similar-attitude [a b]
  report sum (map [agreementfactor first ?1 first ?2] a b )
end
to act
  set prior-size size
  run second (find-action (random-float total-odds) action-prob-pairs)  
  let sim normative-conformity * similar-attitude props pprops / 
                          number-of-propositions 
             - lack-of-princ-penalty * similar-attitude props init-props / 
                          number-of-propositions  
  if size + sim > delta [           
    set size size +  sim
    set change-reputation change-reputation + sim
  ]
  foreach [0 1 2] [
    ifelse item ? strategy-shapes = shape [
      set profit-strategy 
            replace-item ? profit-strategy (size - prior-size) 
    ][
      set profit-strategy 
            replace-item ? profit-strategy (item ? profit-strategy + delta) 
    ]
  ]
end
; The Agent's Actions
to announce 
 if size > announce-threshold [
   ; select a proposition with likelihood proportional to importance
   let announce-odds sum map [second ?] props
   let choice random-float announce-odds   
   let  p 0
   let choice-inc second first props
   while [choice > choice-inc] [
     set p p + 1
     set choice-inc choice-inc + second item p props
   ] 
    
  let w  who
  let evidence (first item p props  + 
                firmness-of-principle * first item p init-props) / 
               (firmness-of-principle + 1)
  let importance (second item p props  + 
                  firmness-of-principle * second item p init-props) / 
               (firmness-of-principle + 1)
  let loud random-float loudness * size
  ask other turtles with [distance myself < loud]
         [ update-announcement w p evidence importance]
  ask patches with [distance myself < loud]
         [ announce-patch myself p evidence importance] 
   ]
end
to question
   let imp  map [second ?] props
   let max-imp-question  position max imp imp   
   ; my most important proposition
   let candidate one-of other turtles with [distance myself < visual-horizon] 
   if candidate != nobody     ; ask a passer-by
       [ask candidate [
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         set questions fput (list myself max-imp-question) questions]]
end
to answer-questions
  if not empty? questions [
     let q one-of questions
     let ag first q
     let ag-dist distance ag     
     let w  who
;     let pps props
     let evidence first (item (second q) props)
     let importance second (item (second q) props)
     ask other turtles with [distance myself <= ag-dist]
       [ update-announcement w (second q)  evidence importance]
;    ask patches with [distance ag < loud ]
;       [ announce-patch ag (second q) evidence importance]    
     set questions []
    ]
end
to-report agrees [v] 
   let i floor (first v / number-of-agents)
   let t  (first v) mod number-of-agents
   ifelse [size] of turtle t < 
          announce-threshold or distance turtle t < visual-horizon 
        [report 1]
        [report agreementfactor (first item i props) first second v]
end
to attack
; attack an agent who made an announcement this agent disagrees with most
  if size > announce-threshold and not empty? announcements  [
     ; rank the announcements for attack
     let agree (map [agrees ?] announcements) 
     let loc position (min agree) agree
     let key 0
     if item loc agree < 0 [
       set key first (item loc announcements)
       ask turtle (key mod number-of-agents) [
         set attacks fput (list myself floor (key / number-of-agents)) attacks]
 
       show (word self " attacks " (key mod number-of-agents))




; select one of the attacks for a reply
if size > 1 [
   let pr  filter [[size] of first ? > 1] attacks 
   ; only attacks one ofthe agents who have sufficient reputation
   if not empty? pr [
      let a one-of pr ; win == s (Epro) = s (Eopenv + Eprenv)
      let p second a
      let epro first item p props
      let ipro second item p props
      let eop first item p [props] of first a
      let iop second item p [props] of first a
      let eprenv (first item p pprops + [first item p pprops] of first a) / 2
      let win 0
      ifelse agreementfactor epro eprenv > agreementfactor eop eprenv 
          [ set win ipro * epro * informational-conformity][  
            set win (-( ipro * (1 - epro) * informational-conformity))
          ] 
      ifelse win > 0 [set win min (list win (delta + [size] of first a))]    
                     [set win max (list win (-(size + delta)))]
      set size size +  win
      ask first a [set size size - win]    
      ifelse win > 0 [
        ask patches with [distance first a <  loudness] 
           [announce-patch first a p epro ipro]
      ][
       ask patches with [distance myself <  loudness] 
           [announce-patch myself p eop iop]
      ]
      ; update the beliefs of the proponent and the opponent 
      let agree (agreementfactor epro  eop) 
      ifelse win > 1 - winthreshold [
;       setopinion p  (list (accepte epro epro) (accepti agree ipro ipro))
        ask first a [setopinion p  
                       (list (accepte epro eop) (accepti agree ipro iop))]
      ][
        if win < winthreshold - 1[                      
          setopinion p  (list (accepte eop epro) (accepti agree iop ipro))
;         ask first a [setopinion p  (list (accepte epro eop) (accepti agree ipro iop))]
        ]
      ]                      
    show (word self "replies attack on " p " of " first a " and wins " win)
  ]]
set attacks []





  rt random undirectedness - random undirectedness
  fd random-float stepsize
end
to find-direction  
; find a direction according to the selected strategy
; 1: (shape = circle) towards the area that corresponds best with the agent's
;    opinion
; 2: (shape = default) perpendicular towards the most corresponding area
; 3: (shape = face happy) away from the most corresponding area
  let p props 
  let b  0
  ifelse (shape = "face happy") 
     [set b min-one-of patches in-radius visual-horizon [similar-attitude p pprops]]
     [set b max-one-of patches in-radius visual-horizon [similar-attitude p pprops]] 
  if b != nobody [face b]
  if shape = "default" [ifelse random 2 =  0 [right 90][left 90]]
end
to change-strategy
; select the first strategy with the highest profit for the its reputation
  let i position max profit-strategy  profit-strategy
  set shape item i strategy-shapes
end
to learn-by-neighbour
  let nb one-of turtles-on neighbors 
  if nb != nobody [
      let  i random number-of-props 
      let evidence first item i props
      let importance second item i props
      let ev first (item i [props] of nb) 
      let imp second (item i [props] of nb) 
      let agree (agreementfactor evidence ev)
      setopinion i  (list (accepte evidence ev) (accepti agree importance imp))
    ]
end
to learn-by-environment
; adapt belief values of a proposition to the values of the environment
; with a chance proportional it the importance of the propositions
   let prop-odds sum map [second ?] props
   let choice random-float prop-odds   
   let  p 0
   let choice-inc second first props
   while [choice > choice-inc] [
     set p p + 1
     set choice-inc choice-inc + second item p props
   ] 
   setopinion p (item p pprops)
end
to mutate
; change the belief values of a random proposition to random values
  setopinion (random number-of-props)  (list (random-float 1) (random-float 1))
end
to setopinion [p evi] 
; p = prop, evi =  (evidence  importance)
  set props replace-item p props evi     
end
to-report generateopinions
  let evids []
  repeat number-of-props [ set evids fput (random-float 1) evids]
  let imps []
  repeat number-of-props [ set imps fput (random-float 1) imps]
  report zip evids imps
end
; Computation of Dependent Parameters.
; Average Belief.
to-report report-eopop

















   report gini  [size] of turtles
end
to-report gini [Lin] ;; expects a list of values.
;  Orders by the lowest rank first (or highest value)
  let L sort-by [?1 > ?2] Lin 
  let N  length L 
  if N <= 1 [report 0]
  let i 0
  let numerator 0
  while [i < N ] [
    set numerator numerator + (i + 1) * (item i L)
    set i i + 1
  ]
  let u  mean L 
  ifelse  u = 0 [report 0] [




to-report clustering ;; Spatial Distribution
  report 1 - mean [avg-dist] of turtles / visual-horizon
end
to-report avg-dist
  let m mean [distance myself] of turtles in-radius visual-horizon
  ifelse m = 0 [report 1][report m]
end
to-report ranks [n L] 
; n =  number of classes,  L = data
;  if L = [] [set L [1]]
  let al n-values n [0]
  let c 1
  if max l != 0 [set c 0.999 * n / max L]
  let ar array:from-list al
  foreach L [ let v floor (c * ?) array:set ar v (array:item ar v) + 1]
  report array:to-list ar
end
to update-plot ;; Plot the parameter values for each cycle. 
                        ;; (For Figures 6 to 9)
  let tmp 0
  set-current-plot "Distribution of Evidence"
    histogram [first item current-prop props] of turtles
    set-current-plot "Importance Distribution"
    histogram [second item current-prop props] of turtles 
 set-current-plot plottitle
    set-current-plot-pen "Reputation Distribution";; black
    set tmp report-authority plot tmp    
    set-current-plot-pen "Spatial Distribution" ;;"friend ratio" ;; green
    set tmp  clustering plot tmp   
    set-current-plot-pen "Average Belief" ;; blue  
    set tmp  report-eopop  plot tmp 
    set-current-plot-pen "Belief Distribution" ;; yellow
    set tmp  report-ginievid plot tmp 
    set-current-plot-pen "Average Importance" ;; green
    set tmp  report-iopop plot tmp 
    set-current-plot-pen "Importance Distribution" ;; yellow
    set tmp  report-giniimp plot tmp               
end
906
Notes
1
Dexia	refers	to	a	Franco-Belgian	financial	institution,	which	was	partially	nationalized	by	the	Belgian	state	in	October	2011.
2
In	2008,	Jeremy	Clarkson	showed	a	track	test	of	a	Tesla	Roadster	car	on	the	BBC	program	Top	Gear,	which	included	a	battery	that	went	flat	after	55	miles,	just	over	a	quarter	of	Tesla's	claimed
range;	the	program	led	to	a	libel	charge	by	the	manufacturer	in	2011.
3
Over	a	number	of	years,	in	2006-2011,	a	number	of	Turkish	immigrants	were	killed	in	Germany,	and	the	police	thought	that	the	perpetrators	might	form	a	mysterious	Turkish	criminal	network.
Finally	it	turned	out	in	2011	that	the	murderers	actually	were	a	small	group	of	Neo-Nazis.
4
The	Hofstad	Network	(in	Dutch:	Hofstadgroep)	is	an	Islamist	group	of	mostly	young	Dutch	Muslims,	members	of	which	were	arrested	and	were	tried	for	planning	terrorist	attacks.
5
The	model	is	available	at	openABM.
6
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/16/3/4.html 29 15/10/2015
In	full-fledged	computational	cognitive	models	such	as	ACT-R,	memory	and	forgetting	are	based	on	elaborate	decay	functions,	related	to	frequency	and	recency	of	use	of	memory	chunks
(Anderson	&	Schooler	2).
7
In	the	case	r	=	0	,	an	agent	is	prepared	to	pay	when	losing,	but	does	not	get	a	return	in	case	of	winning	the	dialogue.	This	makes	sense	only	in	case	the	agent	believes	that	it	stated	an	absolute
(logical)	truth.
8
In	recent	years	in	algorithmic	social	choice	theory,	there	has	been	a	lot	of	attention	for	different	voting	methods,	see	for	example	(Saari	46).
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